Pleasure and Displeasure in Kant’s Practical Philosophy
In this paper, I analyse the theory of motivation in Kant`practical philosophy. I examine the the
feeling of respect and moral feeling, showing their relation to moral action. I show that Kant offers
different answers to this question in different works. In the Groundwork, Kant claims that not only
one can, but one should act without any moral feeling.
In the Doctrine of Virtue, however, Kant claims that there are some feelings which are subjective
conditions of receptiveness of the concept of duty.These are moral feeling, conscience, love of
human beings and self-respect. Moral feeling seems to be a product of the representation of
moral law, consequently it is not an incentive to act morally. However, Kant also claims that moral
feeling is a susceptibility on the part of free choice to be moved by pure practical reason. At the
end, I present the intellectualist-affectionist debate regarding motivation in Kant.