Della peculiarità del Naturzweck.
The goal of the paper is to offer an analysis of the concept of Naturzweck, as we find it in the
Critique of the Power of Judgment. The interpretative path we try to unfold aims to show the
theoretical shift that the concept of natural end undergoes between the Analytic and the Dialectic
of the Teleological Power of Judgment: defined firstly as such that implies something that is
«cause and effect of itself», the notion of natural end unfolds, afterward in the text, as mutual
causal relation between the whole and the parts, hence that what distinguishes natural products
from products of art, according to Kant, is the fact that the former exclude the possibility of an
external producer. In this sense, Kant can say that «one says far too little about nature and its
capacity in organized products if one calls this an analogue of art» (KU, 375; CJ, 246). However,
despite of the theoretical effort made by Kant in §§ 64 and 65 to grasp the specific characters of
natural ends and to distinguish these from artifacts, in the Dialectic of the Teleological Judgment
the natural product seems to be instead thought of only in light of the technical-practical causality.
And this thought is now at the basis of the purely reflecting character of teleological judgment,
thus «experience certainly exhibits ends, but that these are at the same time intentions cannot be
proved in any way» (EE, GS XX, 234; CJ, 35).